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Abstract Government departments and agencies around the world routinely collect
administrative data produced by citizen interaction with the state. The UK gov-
ernment increasingly frames data as an ‘asset’. The potential in administrative data
can be exploited by sharing and linking across datasets, but when the rhetoric of the
benefits of data sharing is bound up in commercial exploitation, trustworthy moti-
vations for sharing data come into question. Such questions are framed around two
apparently conflicting public goods. The public good in re-using data to increase
government efficiency and to enhance research is set against the public good in
protecting privacy. Privacy is a collective as well as an individual benefit, enabling
the public to participate confidently in citizen-state interactions. Balancing these
public goods is challenging given rapidly evolving technology and data science. The
analysis presented here draws on research undertaken by the authors as part of the
Administrative Data Research Centre in England. Between 2014 and 2017, four
case studies were conducted on government administrative data across education,
transport, energy and health. The purpose of the research was to examine stake-
holder perspectives in relation to administrative data sharing and re-use. The themes
of trust, risk and consent were chosen to articulate the research questions and
analysis: this article focuses on the findings related to trust. It explores the notion of
trust in the collection, analysis, linkage and re-use of routinely collected government
administrative data in England. It seeks to demonstrate that securing public trust in
data initiatives is dependent on a broader balance of trust between a network of
actors involved in data sharing and use.
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Introduction
Government departments and agencies around the world routinely collect admin-
istrative data produced by citizen interaction with the state. The UK government
increasingly frames data as an ‘asset’ (Davies and Bawa 2012; Harrison et al. 2015).
The potential in administrative data can be exploited by sharing and linking across
datasets, but when the rhetoric of the benefits of data sharing is bound up in
commercial exploitation, trustworthy motivations for sharing data come into
question (Bates 2012). Such questions are framed around two apparently conflicting
public goods. The public good in re-using data to increase government efficiency
and to enhance research is set against the public good in protecting privacy. Privacy
is a collective as well as an individual benefit, enabling the public to participate
confidently in citizen-state interactions. Balancing these public goods is challenging
given rapidly evolving technology (volume of storage, faster information retrieval
and processing) and data science (more powerful statistical techniques and
algorithms) which have led to increasingly powerful means to ‘collect, manage,
combine, analyse and derive insight’ from data (Nuffield 2014, p. xvii, 4). In
sophisticated technological environments, these public goods are entangled in
complex ways (Grace and Taylor 2013). Questions of trust begin to emerge, the
most central of which is whether the public can put their trust in the government’s
ability to strike the right balance between public goods in extending sharing of
administrative data across and beyond government. For those with responsibility for
advising the government on policy in this area, the importance of securing public
trust is well understood, and gaining trust from data subjects and the broader public
is an essential ingredient in enabling government data-sharing initiatives to develop
(Caldicott 2016).
This article explores the notion of trust in the collection, analysis, linkage and re-
use of routinely collected government administrative data in England. It seeks to
demonstrate that securing public trust in data initiatives is dependent on a broader
balance of trust between a network of actors involved in data sharing and use. In
examining this balance of trust, the article will explore how processes and systems
intended to build and monitor trustworthiness across these interrelations can
sometimes have an unintended detrimental impact on the balance of trust between
stakeholders. Although the research setting is England, we believe that the issues it
illustrates about trust in data have wider resonance (Yoon 2017).
Research methods
The analysis presented here draws on research undertaken by the authors as part of the
Administrative Data Research Centre in England (ADRC-E). Between 2014 and 2017,
four case studies were conducted on government administrative data across education,
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transport, energy and health. The purpose of the research was to examine stakeholder
perspectives in relation to administrative data sharing and re-use. Each case study
constitutes one bounded or instrumental case (Stake 2005), whereby the case ‘plays a
supportive role and… facilitates our understanding of something else’: in this study, the
secondary use of administrative data. The qualitative study used semi-structured
interviews as the main data collection method, supported by documentary analysis and a
systematic literature review. In the interviews, the re-use (or secondary use) of
government administrative data by academic researchers was the central lens through
which data issues and stakeholder perspectives were examined. The themes of trust, risk
and consent were chosen at the outset to articulate the research questions and structure
dialogue with stakeholders. Following Stake’s constructivist methodology, data
collection proceeded from a flexible, relatively unstructured conceptual framework
(around the three themes), began with stakeholder interviews and triangulated with
documentary evidence, in order to obtain a holistic understanding of the issues.
Gathering perspectives from academic researchers at various levels of seniority who use
government administrative data in their research formed the core of each case study.
However, their views were contextualised through interviews with other stakeholders
including government bodies acting as data providers, policy makers, advisors,
regulatory bodies, research funders and lobby groups. In the education case study, data
subjects were also included.
This article draws on the education and health data case studies, comprising 30
individual interviews and four respondents in a focus group, and focuses on the
findings related to trust. The extensive range of data providers and datasets in the
fields of health and education, the higher levels of public awareness and interest in
data use relating to health and to education, and the larger numbers of well-
established researchers using quantitative data allowed for more extensive studies in
terms of the breadth of stakeholders and number of participants included. In each
field there is a core dataset which is commonly used by researchers (described
below) so that we could interrogate researchers’ experiences of using the same data.
We were not seeking to produce a single subject-based analysis or to make direct
comparisons between the two subject fields, but rather to extrapolate the higher
level issues around trust and government administrative data. Details of intervie-
wees in these two case studies are given below. Interviewees were anonymised and
extracts are referred to by the anonymisation code:
Education case study
Categorisation of interviewees Numbers interviewed
University data manager 1
Academic researchers 7
Research board member 1
Department for education 2
Undergraduate student 1
Postgraduate students 4 in focus group
Total/reference codes 16/FG1, A6-A17
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Interview protocols were developed for each group of interviewees. For example,
the interview questions for academic researchers were structured according to the
five phases of the Data Documentation Initiative’s research data lifecycle model
(DDI 2014) chosen because of its likely greater familiarity to the respondents than,
for example, the records continuum: discovery and planning, data collection, data
preparation and analysis, publication and sharing, and long-term management.
Initial questions were such as, can you give me a brief outline of the type of research
that you do, including any relevant recent projects which have made use of
government administrative data? Does your research involve purely administrative
data, or do you link administrative data to other data sources (e.g. survey data,
longitudinal cohort studies)? Does your research use administrative data from a
single government source, or from two or more departments? Do you use this data
with a single research purpose in mind, or do you (intend to) re-use the same dataset
to investigate other research questions? Followed by detailed questions about the
respondent’s experience of designing the data research project, finding and
discovering existing data sources, consent for sharing, checking, validating,
cleaning and anonymising data, data security, data interpretation and so on. To
provide a contextual backdrop to our findings we describe here the types and range
of government administrative datasets that the researchers we interviewed used.
In the education case study, the main dataset used by researchers was the
National Pupil Database (NPD), a person-level database which matches pupil and
school characteristic data to pupil attainment for the primary purpose of tracking
student attainment. Raw data from the school census form part of the NPD (https://
data.gov.uk/dataset/school-census). Access to the NPD including sharing for wider
purposes was subject to a government consultation in 2012 (Department for Edu-
cation 2013). Researchers can apply to the Department for Education for linked
extracts of the NPD to Higher Education Statistics (HESA) data, and to records of
students in Further Education (Individual Learning Record or ILR).
In the health case study, across the National Health Service (NHS), data
(including identifiable patient data) are collected at various levels of administration
across primary (General Practice) and secondary (hospital) care settings. To ensure
adequate safeguarding over patient data, the flow of data is tightly regulated and
controlled, under legislation reinforced through data governance systems. Reviews
Health case study
Categorisation of interviewees Numbers interviewed
Data provider (NHS digital and others) 4
Academic researchers 6
NHS England 4
Privacy lobby group (Medconfidential) 1
Research funding body (Wellcome Trust) 1
Health research authority 1
Senior policy advisor on health data 1
Total/reference codes 18/A36–A53
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by the National Data Guardian for Health and Care, Dame Fiona Caldicott, have
been influential in highlighting areas of weakness in the system and advocating for
stronger approaches to data governance (Caldicott 1997, 2013, 2016). Central
control of administrative health data is mainly undertaken by NHS Digital. NHS
Digital was established in 2013 as the Health and Social Care Information Centre
(HSCIC), under the Health and Social Care Act 2012 with statutory powers to
collect, process, and provide access to data. Its name changed in 2016. NHS Digital
is the national provider for England of information, data and IT systems across
health and social care.
The main dataset that researchers in the health case study used was Hospital
Episodes Statistics (HES), a patient-level database containing over a billion records
of patients attending Accident and Emergency units, admitted for treatment or
attending outpatients clinics at NHS Hospitals including acute hospitals, primary
care trusts and mental health trusts, in England. The primary function of HES is to
allow hospitals to be paid for the care they deliver, but it is also a valuable resource
for secondary use by NHS management and for health research. NHS Digital
publishes annual HES data for 2009–2014 at provider level as open data (via data.
gov.uk). Research access to patient-level data is via the Data Access Request
Service (DARS) of NHS Digital.
What is trust?
Three of the authors of this paper have a background in archives and records
management and therefore our own understandings of trust are bound up with those
asserted within archival theory. Archival definitions of trust are rooted in the record
as object and have traditionally revolved around the question of what makes records
‘trustworthy’. Trust is synonymous with ‘public faith’ (MacNeil 2011, p. 176)
which depends on showing that the record is what it purports to be (authenticity) and
free from corruption and tampering (reliability). Public trust in reliability and
authenticity depends on the record having adequate conditions of custody, secured
by the twin notions of ‘trusted custodian’ and ‘trusted repository’. The three-way
relationship between trusted record, trusted custodian and trusted repository is what
Heather MacNeil describes as a ‘central trope’ in archival science (2011, p. 175).
However, the simplicity of this three-way relationship hides a more complex
picture. The fluid nature of digital records, alongside their dynamism and
multiplicity, forces a confrontation with traditional archival understandings. What
archivists now see is that there is entanglement between the record, space–time and
human agents. We are beginning to understand that public trust in the record is a
fluid construct, dependent on an ever-changing dynamic between the record, the
space–time in which it exists, and those that interact with it.
Although building public trust in the record, the repository, and the custodian has
been central to archival science, there has been surprisingly little exploration of the
nature of trust in them. A ‘trusted custodian’ and a ‘trusted repository’ are simply
mechanisms for preserving the record’s authenticity and reliability. The impacts on
public trust made by broader human interactions with the record (by researchers,
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users and communities) are largely unexplored (Sundqvist 2011; Yoon 2014, 2017
are exceptions). Understandings of trust across sociology, philosophy and psychol-
ogy do not take an object (i.e. a record) as their starting point for definition and
exploration, but focus on how trust operates in human relationships. These other
perspectives can enhance archival understandings of what trust is and helped the
authors to conceptualise trust in relation to government data sharing and use.
Explorations of trust in human relationships have conceptualised trust as an
attitude and an affect (Baier 1986; Holton 1994; Jones 1996). Jones (1996), for
example, suggests that trust ‘is an attitude of optimism that the goodwill and
competence of another will extend to cover the domain of our interaction with her,
together with the expectation that the one trusted will be directly and favourably
moved by the thought that we are counting on her.’ Nickel (2007) highlights how
attitudes between truster and trusted are underpinned by a mutual sense of duty and
obligation. Holton (1994) draws out the affective qualities attached to trust, through
feelings of gratitude when trust in someone is rewarded and betrayal when trust is
disappointed. Giddens (1991) draws on Simmel to suggest that trust is most
accurately described as a form of faith because it expresses an affective
commitment to something or someone (Giddens 1991, p. 25).
Others have conceptualised trust as a cognitive and rational judgment (Hardin
2002; O’Neill 2002b). Hardin (2002) describes trust as ‘rational expectations of the
self-interested behaviour of the trusted’. For Hardin, trust operates through a
cognitive assessment by the truster on the motivations and ‘encapsulated interest’ of
the trusted. Trust is linked to reciprocity and overlapping interests: ‘I trust you
because your interests encapsulate mine to some extent’ (Hardin 2002, p. xix). Trust
is contextual, a three-part relationship, ‘grounded in the truster’s assessment of the
intentions of the trusted with respect to some action’ (Hardin 2002, p. xix).
O’Neill sees trust as a rational judgment but ‘displayed in making an overall
judgment in the face of incomplete evidence’ (Seemann 2007, p. 5). In other words,
for O’Neill, trust is not a matter of ‘blind deference’ but is about placing trust with
‘good judgment’ in ‘less than certainty’ (Seemann 2007, p. 6). O’Neill makes the
striking point that ‘trust is needed not because everything is wholly predictable,
let alone wholly guaranteed, but on the contrary because life has to be led without
guarantees’ (2002b, p. 24). Similar arguments have been put forward, for example,
by Six et al. (2015) who describe trust as ‘a lubricant’ that enables the smooth
running of actions, and view trust as an antidote to being stuck in inertia (p. 155).
This links with the notion that trust has an important part to play in enabling
cooperative social relations (Luhmann 1980; Putnam 1993; Fukuyama 1995).
In Questions of Trust, ‘trust’ and ‘acting on trust’ are somewhat conflated by
O’Neill, who explores the tendency for individuals to say that they do not trust
industries and institutions whilst choosing to buy their products or opt into their
services (2002b, p. 11–14). For O’Neill, because they act as if they trust, people
may trust even when they say they do not (2002b, p. 14). Hardin’s formulation
makes a distinction between ‘trust’ and ‘acting on trust’. For Hardin, trust is
cognitive not behavioural. Hardin separates the act of cooperation from trust: ‘I can
take the risk of cooperating with you even though I do not trust you’ (Hardin 2002,
p. 11). Therefore, an individual may ‘not trust doctors’ but will cooperate with a
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specific doctor in assessing options and risks in a given context. Luhmann argues
that ‘trust is a solution for specific problems of risk’ (2000, p. 95). He separates
passive and un-reflexive confidence from trust: we act confidently with little
deliberation to avoid overwhelming uncertainty and paralysis. Trust, however, is a
deeper reflexive process that ‘presupposes a situation of risk’ (2000, p. 97). ‘You
can avoid taking the risk, but only if you are willing to waive the associated
advantages’ of an action (2000, p. 97). For Luhmann, the decision to trust is an
acceptance that the harm may outweigh the benefits (2000, p. 98), but trust ‘allows
risk-taking decisions’ (2000, p. 103).
Rather than seeking to find a fixed and stable definition of trust, we would argue
that each of the formulations of trust highlighted here offers an insight into what is a
dynamic and multi-layered social construct. Trust is a relational attitude with both
affective and cognitive attributes, akin to a form of faith. It results from reflexive
deliberation that is always contingent on context. It supports the shared goodwill
between parties in awareness of reciprocal duties and obligations. A precondition of
trust is the absence of complete assurance, and it therefore relates to an assessment
of risk.
As a multi-layered construct, trust in people and things can operate at various
levels of aggregation. Trust can play a part in one-to-one relationships, in face-to-face
as well as faceless interactions. It can figure at a collective level (such as ‘public trust’
in the government). In relation to trust in government data sharing and re-use, we
have sought to understand trust at different levels of aggregation and between entities
when people interact with government institutions, systems and processes.
Mapping relationships of trust in government administrative data
To understand how trust and trust relationships figure in the sharing and re-use of
government administrative data, we needed to understand the interdependent
relationships between the various stakeholders and actors, and the context
surrounding government administrative data. We analysed all our interview data
to identify the relationships between key actors as described by our interviewees.
Descriptions from our interviewees were richest in describing the relational
interdependencies around academic research re-use of data and form the focus of
our model. As one interviewee said:
…in the end it comes down to trust; developing trust between the data
providers and those who are going to gain access to the data, [and] sometimes
that trust requires intermediaries who can act to negotiate on behalf of
researchers. (A15)
In the model given in Fig. 1, we categorise stakeholders into three broad groups:
data providers, data users (of whom our focus is on researchers) and data subjects.
These foundational stakeholder relationships are shaped by further independencies
across oversight bodies, intermediary groups, the media and a wider public. Each
stakeholder group represented in the model has a complex interdependent
relationship with the other stakeholders and actors represented: the model attempts
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to visualise how these are suspended in a balance of co-dependency. We call this
model the ‘trust balance’ because these complex interdependencies rely on building
and maintaining a relational attitude of trust, bound by an array of duties and
obligations.
Shifting relationships: faceless connections in an abstract system
Across our case studies, researchers who have used government administrative data
in their research over a long period (i.e. for more than 5 years) spoke of a shift in the
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nature of the relationships underpinning their access to government administrative
datasets (the research user—data provider relationship). Previously access depended
on building up strong one-to-one relationships with key gatekeepers in government
departments. Interviewees described a trend towards standardised, impersonal
mechanisms for data access:
Back then, there wasn’t really an access route to getting the National Pupil
Database. And it was all a lot more informal. And it typically was sort of given
on a researcher by researcher basis, and additionally, only to those people who
knew the correct people within the Department for Education to speak to.
(A11)
Most researchers recognised that a standardised approach led to fairer access and
that this was generally a positive step:
So, you know, as that process formalised, which, you know, I’m greatly
encouraging of, through the mechanism that you can apply for the data
directly through DfE and there’s no longer this sort of mechanism where
you’ve got to know the right person, the assessment process is very fair in my
experience, and also very uniform in terms of the things you can and can’t do,
whereas I think in the past that was probably not the case. (A11)
However, there was also a strong articulation amongst a subset of researcher
interviewees on the challenges that occur when access becomes predicated on
systemically driven interactions, rather than close interpersonal ties. For some, the
loss of a more personal approach to custodianship and its replacement by generic
access procedures reflected a higher turnover of gatekeeping staff. This was
perceived to lead to a loss of data provider expertise which, in turn, has a
detrimental impact on the researcher’s ability to understand the data they receive
from the provider:
… if you wanted to know about that data you rang that nice man [redaction]
and he would be very helpful… And then once it went into the Information
Centre in Leeds it was a whole succession of people who were moved on very
quickly and they no longer had any particular interest in the data…they tried
to be helpful but they weren’t very knowledgeable. (A44)
In Consequences of Modernity (1991), Anthony Giddens builds on his earlier
work on structuration and the reproduction of social practices. A central theme is
how trust operates in relation to modern abstract systems. Giddens argues that
abstract systems comprise symbolic tokens which circulate in expert systems (i.e.
systems of technical or professional expertise that organise the material and social
environments in which people live). He suggests that the rise of modern abstract
systems is a feature of an increasingly globalised world, where traditional patterns
of local (face-to-face) interactions have given way to increasingly distant
relationships with absent others. In abstract systems, our relational ties stretch, as
we increasingly interact with the world through faceless processes. By ‘disembed-
ding’ processes in abstract systems, face-to-face, local interactions are restructured
across intervals in space and time. Abstract systems enable what Giddens refers to
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as time–space distantiation. Interactions in the abstract system are frequently
‘faceless’, as actors interact with the system itself (e.g. through automated
information exchange) rather than through personal contact (‘facework’). The
increasingly ‘faceless’ nature of relational ties in abstract systems resonates strongly
with our interview data. Whilst ‘faceless’ interactions with a generic access process
was seen as an increasing trend, opportunities within these processes for sustained
‘facework’ (i.e. personal one-to-one contact) with an experienced and knowledge-
able individual acting on behalf of the data provider were not only highly valued
and sought out, but were seen as essential in establishing a workable relationship:
[In the end] we were lucky that someone in HSCIC turned out to be someone
who [name of colleague] knew, and so we contacted him directly and [after
weeks of hold ups] in a day he redrafted the agreements and got them though
which just shows you what happens when you finally have contact with a
competent person. (A44)
Giddens’ description of abstract systems also provides a frame for thinking
about how routinely collected government administrative data circulates as a
symbolic token within an increasingly distantiated expert system. Taking public
sector health data as an example, patient information created as part of a face-to-
face ‘doctor-patient’ relationship becomes disembodied from its originating
context through data coding and extraction processes. It is further distantiated
in its reconfiguration as part of large datasets, which in turn are expanded and
stretched through time and space as datasets are linked across and beyond health
and social care. Different data custodians are responsible for different datasets
which are re-used by third parties, interactions which all take the data further from
the creating context. As our researcher interviewees articulate, the relationship
between data users and data providers is itself becoming more distanced, abstract
and faceless as standardised protocols for access take over from personal
gatekeeping as a means of governing the tie between provider and researcher. A
complex legislative and regulatory environment, with many oversight institutions
managing data quality, security and use, governs the relationship between provider
and researcher. Faceless processes of governance are increasingly foregrounded
over traditional relational bonds.
When the sharing and re-use of routinely collected administrative data is framed
as an abstract system, we become aware of: (1) the stretching of the data away from
its originating relational ties; (2) the complexity and opacity of the data flows within
the system; (3) the number of bodies involved in managing or interacting with the
data; and (4) the increasingly impersonal nature of interactions within the system. In
the light of all of this, can we say that a balance of trusting relationships holds the
system together?
Exploring interdependencies
The notion of balancing trusting relationships emerges through a deeper analysis of
our interviewees’ descriptions of the relational interdependencies that exist between
stakeholders. Our interviewees talked in depth about how behaviour, actions and
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processes around data sharing are shaped, bounded and modified by attempts to
build and maintain the good will of other stakeholders.
The researchers we interviewed frequently spoke of a determination to act
responsibly with data, and how this determination is driven partly from their own
vested interest in doing so. Acting irresponsibly would result in reputational damage
for the individual and their institution, and likely exclusion from future research
participation. Researchers are well aware of their reliance on building and
maintaining the favour and goodwill of other stakeholders (data providers, data
subjects, broader public, research institutions, and the research community). They
are also aware that their behaviour as an individual has an impact on this wider
network:
Most researchers work in a research institute or a university, if they’re
getting access to administrative data. And they, when they’re given access,
their employer is bound into a set of conditions about how they must
behave with respect to those data, and the penalties for disobeying that or
abusing that set of rules and guidelines is fairly extreme. … a lifetime ban
on their receipt of further ESRC [Research Council] funding. It can also be
a ban on funding to their organisation …. So the penalties are quite
draconian, so it means then that the individual and the institution has a
very strong incentive to ensure that their employees do not do anything
inappropriate. (A15)
This interdependence is in line with Nickel’s (2007) framing of trust as driven by
a mutual sense of duty and obligation and Hardin’s (2002) idea of trust driven by
‘encapsulated interest’. Researchers and research institutions have a stake in
complying and this relational interdependence enables individuals and institutions
to form a bond of trust.
If the formation of these trusting bonds relies on the balance of the
interdependencies between stakeholders, then the behaviour of each stakeholder
affects all the surrounding bonds of trust. One researcher in the health case study
spoke of the impact a researcher can have on the reputation of both the data provider
and the broader research community:
You will always have this tension that comes from liability, we only need one
researcher to sell the data, or lose the data for 100,000 patients and that is a big
issue for the HSCIC, they will not release any datasets for about three years
because why would you? You are going to be the one up in front of
Parliament, why did you release it to them? Did you go and check their server?
Did you do a security check? No of course they didn’t, they are relying on
someone signing a piece of paper and doing what they are said they would.
(A41)
Researchers in the education case study also described this effect on the
interdependent bonds between stakeholders:
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Nobody else has the kind of access that the research community has, and any
abuse of the trust that people put in the research community can impact very
strongly on that privilege. (A15)
… about ten years ago, civil servants, you know, disks containing missile
deployments were left on trains and buses, and we then all suffered for that.…
education researchers and education data. … it just struck me that we’re all
now suffering because of some mistakes made by other people. Which is
always the way. Instead of just saying, right, you made a mistake, we’re going
to make the system harder for everybody. (A9)
The interdependencies between stakeholders make the balance of trust across the
abstract system a precarious one. One stakeholder’s commitment to meeting their
duties and obligations may not be enough to establish a balance of trust. Unfulfilled
duties and obligations by others initiate a loss of goodwill which spreads across the
bonds of trust, placing a stress on all relational interactions.
Tensions in securing public trust in abstract systems
All types of interviewees (researchers, data providers, policy makers) in both the
education and health case studies spoke of establishing and maintaining public trust
as a prerequisite for data-sharing initiatives, yet there was also a consensus that
securing public trust is a difficult task:
Public trust is very very easy to lose, and the moment you have headlines like
Tesco owns your medical records, or insurance companies have got your
medical records, this instils fear into people—fear, uncertainty, the
unknown—who is accessing my data and why? And losing public trust has
wide ramifications. It can potentially impact on the relationship between the
doctor and patients. If you went to your GP would you be reluctant to tell them
something important because you were worried about where the data could
end up? That would be absolutely catastrophic…So public perception does
matter and losing it has an impact on the potential to use data for research.
(A41)
When doubt is cast over how the system operates, the public do not have enough
knowledge to make a rational calculation of risk. Giddens highlights how the
processes of disembedding and time–space distantiation inherent in abstract systems
have a disorienting effect, we experience life as a ‘careering juggernaut’ (1991,
p. 53), and this leads to increasing levels of uncertainty and anxiety and an increased
perception of risk. Similarly, O’Neill highlights how modern life is framed by
sociologists as a ‘risk society’ where ‘living amongst highly complex institutions
and practices whose effects we cannot control or understand’ means that we ‘see
ourselves as subject to hidden and incomprehensible sources of risk’ (2002b, p. 15).
O’Neill suggests that our heightened perception of risk, rather than ‘the seriousness
of the hazards to which people are exposed, or the likelihood that those hazards will
harm them’ (2002b, p. 16), has led to an apparent ‘crisis of trust’. She explores
whether the loss of trust in our governments, institutions, professionals, and experts
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is symptomatic of the ‘public mood of suspicion’ inherent in a risk society or a
‘justified response to growing untrustworthiness’ (2002b, p. 16).
We examined this phenomenon in the health setting, which has suffered adverse
media coverage of data release in the growing culture of suspicion over the
government’s care.data programme (discussed later), reports that the NHS has one
of the worst records for data protection breaches reported to the Information
Commissioner’s Office (The Guardian 2016a), and that patient data have been
passed onto commercial companies without consent, for example, the data-sharing
agreement between the Royal Free London NHS Foundation Trust and Google’s
Artificial Intelligence company DeepMind (The Guardian 2016b; Financial Times
2016; ICO 2017). The bad news of untrustworthiness grabs public attention more
easily than the good news of trustworthiness (O’Neill 2002b, p. 17). As O’Neill
(2002a, p. 11) sums up, ‘A culture of blame and accusation is widespread, both in
the media and in the literature of campaigning organisations where fingers are
pointed variously at government, scientists and at business.’
Our interviewees understood this:
So [there is now] a much greater awareness from the public about how much
data is connected, and the various uses to which data is put. An awareness that
has tended, over the last decade, I would say, to have presented itself to most
of the public through the media, which has not been helpful because much of
the media has a particular, and I would say biased, slant on this. (A51)
The difference between trust and trustworthiness
One response to a loss of public trust is the ‘audit explosion’ (O’Neill 2002b, p. 21),
the aim of which is to reduce risk and increase trustworthiness by expanding
measures to demonstrate the competence, security and reliability of the abstract
system. The rise of information governance in institutional contexts including the
NHS as a system of monitoring to control risk and increase accountability is
symptomatic of the audit culture. The question raised by O’Neill is a vital one: do
these measures have any impact on securing or maintaining trust?
Following scrutiny of HSCIC by the UK Parliament Health Select Committee,
Sir Nick Partridge (2014) led a review of data releases made by one of its
predecessor organisations, the NHS Information Centre (NHS IC). The review
found that in only nine of the 3059 releases under review (0.3%) were there any
grounds for concern over data sharing. Yet, Partridge recommended that HSCIC
should further standardise and tighten mechanisms for compliance and account-
ability in an attempt to eliminate personal data breaches entirely. The Partridge
review illustrates a risk society where cycles of ‘prevention and sanction’
symptomatic of the audit explosion are the prescribed remedy to the question of
trust (O’Neill 2002b, p. 44).
Measures to improve trustworthiness, such as those which demonstrate effective
and proportionate governance rather than disproportionate levels of audit, may
increase the trustworthiness of a system. Sundqvist (2011, p. 289) showed that
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control documentation designed to ensure measurable trustworthiness in record-
keeping procedures (for instance through compliance with trusted standards and
guidance) may have a positive relationship with building trust, by boosting a
truster’s positive opinion of a trustee’s reliability, but she warns ‘not necessarily so.’
One data provider said:
Do we audit compliance, um, no. We can’t really… a lot of it is down to trust.
We’re trusting what the customer is telling us as being true. We can’t audit
everything that they’re telling us. (A13)
Trustworthiness and trust are not equivalents. Some interviewees recognised
tightening data governance as symptomatic not of gaining public trust but of the
diminution of trust between data providers and researchers:
There’s been less trust of researchers, more, yeah, more bureaucracy, a lot
more form filling and a lot more hassle to get access to any of the stuff that
you could use, even when, it appears to me, you’re not asking for anything
particularly sensitive. (A9)
O’Neill’s argument is in line with this interviewee’s comments. The audit
explosion with its focus on increasing the trustworthiness of systems as a means of
raising public trust in fact seeks to generate trust by eradicating the need for it. ‘It is
an agenda of replacing traditional relations of trust, now grown problematic, with
stronger systems for securing trustworthiness, an agenda, as John Thompson puts it,
for economising on trust’ (O’Neill 2002a, p. 130). A focus on trustworthiness
undermines the need for trust.
Increased trustworthiness may instead ‘deepen the distrust it seeks to remedy’
(Thompson 2000, p. 253–4 in O’Neill 2002a, p. 130). Systems that focus on
trustworthiness at the expense of trust will only work if the system and those that
interact with it are completely infallible. Yet no matter how tightly regulated,
controlled, secure and audited the system is, human error or human deviance will
emerge. As the Partridge review (2014) demonstrated the system will prove to be
untrustworthy. A culture of distrust will pervade. A number of the interviewees
acknowledged the inevitability of failure, summarised by one in the following
terms:
Those responsible for reviewing data [requests] they know that in the long,
long, long term they will approve something they shouldn’t because someone
will lie to them and they won’t catch it, and their job is to hope that it doesn’t
happen on their watch. …when people determined on misuse, read the rules
and have time to decide how they will respond to them, they will work out a
way round, and that is not a scenario where public trust in the long term will
continue, simply because at some point somebody will do something stupid.
(A49)
O’Neill draws on Thompson to suggest that measures to increase trustworthiness
may ‘increase inefficiency’ by adding ‘further layers of bureaucracy’ and this may
also ‘exasperate rather than alleviate’ a sense of distrust (2002a, p. 130). This is in
keeping with the findings of our health case study in relation to levels of trust
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between researchers seeking to access data and data providers who act as data
custodians. In response to the Partridge review recommendations, HSCIC halted
processing data requests whilst they reviewed their procedures and introduced new
measures. The researchers we interviewed described the far-reaching consequences
for the research community, many of whom faced considerable delays in receiving
data for research purposes. These delays affected the wider research governance
framework as timeframes set by research funders became unachievable in the face
of data provider delays. The reciprocal relationship of trust and goodwill between
HSCIC and researchers was placed under considerable strain. Research approved by
university ethics committees as being in the public interest, legal and ethical, was
put on hold. Our interviews suggested that the delays were particularly problematic
for PhD researchers working to very fixed timescales, forcing some of them to
reduce the scope of their research in order to use more easily available datasets. One
PhD supervisor we interviewed described it as ‘extraordinarily disturbing’ (A40) for
the students involved.
The focus on measures to increase trustworthiness at the expense of the
maintenance of relations of trust may damage the ‘encapsulated trust’ between
researchers and data providers. Researchers trust data providers to enable timely
access to data because doing so enables them to fulfil their remit in supporting
beneficial research. The data provider trusts the researcher not to abuse the system
(through incompetence or malfeasance) because it is in the researcher’s best
interests to play by the rules. O’Neill suggests that institutions must aim, in the
laudable pursuit of trustworthiness, for mechanisms of ‘intelligent accountability’
(2002b, p. 59). This entails recognising the separation between trustworthiness and
trust, and looking for ways to build and maintain both.
Intelligent accountability recognises that detailed contractual agreements
between data-sharing parties and complex auditing may replace trust. Detailed
monitoring suggests to the public that data users cannot be trusted. Intelligent
accountability seeks a balance between the bureaucracy necessary to ensure
trustworthy systems and maintaining trust relationships. Considered in this way,
Partridge’s recommendation that the HSCIC develop an audit function to monitor
‘other party’ compliance of its data-sharing agreements becomes questionable:
I think [the Partridge review] contributed to the perception of system failure. I
am not convinced there was necessarily a system failure. Is it the business of
the HSCIC to track through contract after contract to see if people have done
what they are supposed to do? Usually you would expect people to fulfil their
contractual obligations, where they don’t you introduce sanctions, which is
usually not doing business anymore and withdrawing. So I think they have
gone out of their way to look for breaches…and they have created a climate of
distrust through that. (A42)
Hardin (2002) argues that relational trust that does not involve direct
interpersonal connection (such as in abstract systems): what stands in place of
trust is citizen cooperation. Cooperation is based on undeliberated confidence which
is itself dependent on our ‘inductive expectations’ from past behaviour and
reputation (pp. 151–172). This works if the public’s confidence in the system
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remains relatively unchallenged. However, media reports and lobby groups casting
doubt on the system force the public into a deliberative choice on whether to trust or
distrust. If the public’s confidence turns into distrust, then cooperation is likely to be
withdrawn.
The ‘debacle’ (A36) surrounding the care.data programme illustrates this. NHS
England announced the care.data initiative in 2013 to extend the data collection
already undertaken by HSCIC across the NHS to include General Practice (GP) and
other records in a national database, alongside the HES dataset of hospital episodes
and other data, pseudonymised and centrally maintained. Datasets could be linked to
enable better planning, managing and commissioning of healthcare across NHS
England, more comprehensive whole population research and more effective care
pathways and service models. However, the programme was subject to relentless
public scrutiny and criticism. The loss of public confidence led to withdrawal of
citizen cooperation, as over a million citizens opted-out. Deliberative public distrust
had taken hold. In the face of this public mistrust and opposition from health
professionals, the programme was put on (now indefinite) hold.
The failure of care.data has been explored from many different perspectives
(Mann 2016; Torjesen 2014; Carter et al. 2015; Hays and Daker-White 2015; van
Staa et al. 2016; Vezyridis and Timmons 2017). Concerns about trustworthiness of
the proposals over privacy and data security, a lack of adequate communication
around the safeguards for access and use of the data, and concerns over data
commercialisation led to its demise. The nature of informed consent and the
adequacy of the consent model as ‘opt-out’ rather than ‘opt-in’ undermined trust
(Hays and Daker-White 2015 in van Staa et al. 2016). Did the care.data programme
falter because the system underpinning it was not trustworthy? Or, did it falter
because of inadequate communication with the public aimed at establishing trust in
the programme and the benefits it would lead to? In contrast to successful analogous
programmes in Wales and Scotland (Jones et al. 2014; SAIL 2017; SHIP 2017),
care.data failed to generate ‘social legitimacy’ (Carter et al. 2015). A reliance on the
legal basis of the programme as sufficient licence for it, combined with a belief that
the one-to-one warrants of trust between a GP and patient over confidentiality and
use of data could be unproblematically extended into a national linked data
programme, reflected a failure to understand the necessity of securing adequate
degrees of informed and deliberated public trust in a distantiated data initiative.
Generating public trust
Is transparency enough?
We invited our interviewees to share their perceptions of the best ways to secure
public trust in government administrative data initiatives. Our analysis of
interviewee responses indicates that transparency over the purposes of an initiative,
the processes that underpin it, and the safeguards surrounding it, was the most often
cited means through which to secure public trust:
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It is around making people aware of the purposes that their data will be used
for. …this is why we are using your data, I think Joe Public are generally ok
about it, it is when something happens to their data that they aren’t aware of,
that is when people start getting twitchy…Once you get on that back foot
where it has been used without consent and without awareness, then … you
are probably going to get distrust—I won’t give my data again because you
have used it in this way without my knowledge…As long as patients are
informed, and they don’t feel like it has been done behind their back, I think
that is the key isn’t it? (A38)
Interviewees agreed that levels of transparency over data flows, systems and
programmes could and should be improved:
There are two types of trust question. One the more you know about the
problem the more concerned you get, bioweapons for example, and there is
another type where the more you learn the less concerned you get, and health
data should be in the latter category because there is actually quite a lot of
governance. The problem is because the governance is secret, it is a case of are
you sure that nobody has broken or abused the system? (A49)
So there’s a balancing act here between transparency, thinking about the ethics
but with the default being if the data can be used for the public good it should
be. (A12)
However, despite advocating for transparency, the majority of the interviewees
also alluded to the complexities. Data flows, control systems, organisational roles,
types of data, uses of data, variety of users, and the legislative and regulatory
frameworks and oversight bodies that make up the monitoring and safeguarding
system is complex, technical and opaque. The question is how to be transparent:
For me, as a transparency advocate, I find this incredibly challenging because I
want to be out there talking to the public about what we are doing with their
data, and to have them give their views…but data sharing and data linkage are
actually incredibly complicated ideas. … I think we have not been good
enough about demonstrating to people what their information looks like, and
my experience is that you get shunted into doing 20 min with a group of 15
patients trying to tell them what the programme is doing and getting them to
say ‘yeah it sounds like a good idea’. Actually it is very hard to do that… but
if you want them to properly input into what we are doing you have to spend
time educating them and building up that knowledge base before they can start
to input properly. (A43)
Giddens argues that public trust in abstract systems ‘does not depend on full
initiation into the systems processes or mastery of the knowledge they yield’
(Giddens 1991, p. 27) but on pragmatic experience that such systems generally work
as they are supposed to. Research by Ipsos MORI (2014, 2016) on the relationship
between public understanding and public trust in the uses of data and of data linking
and by Health e-Research Centre (2016) asking to what extent patients should
control access to data, indicated that participants had very low awareness of these
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issues and tended to be sceptical initially. Two or three days of dialogue increased
knowledge and anxiety about data sharing and social research but eventually led to
more positive associations about its value, as ‘greater knowledge about the subject
and exposure to the ideas tends to be related to acceptance’ (Ipsos MORI 2016). We
can describe this as a tipping point where knowledge of data-sharing systems and
processes becomes sufficient to enable trust. However, as one of our interviewees
pointed out, such an intensive process cannot be replicated for the whole population.
In the case of care.data, NHS England notified every household in England with
brief information in a leaflet, which tended to increase public anxiety without
increasing trust. Transparency should provide mechanisms for those that want to
become more knowledgeable about initiatives, systems and processes, whilst
keeping the programmes out of the headlines. The aim is to be quietly transparent so
as to maintain undeliberated confidence. However, there is an inherent problem with
too quiet an approach: since the legislative framework supports freedom of
information, data initiatives do not stay quiet. When the public learn of data
initiatives through the media rather than communication and dialogue initiated by
public bodies, a culture of suspicion grows. Quiet transparency may therefore be
counterproductive especially given the perspectives of the National Data Guardian,
Dame Fiona Caldicott, who has consistently advocated for ‘no surprises’ in relation
to data sharing for the patient and wider public (Caldicott 1997, 2013, 2016).
When handling transparency, the question is how to raise awareness and involve
the public in discussion, without inducing hysteria and panic: how to get the balance
between too much and too little information. We posed this question to the National
Data Guardian for Health and Social Care, Dame Fiona Caldicott, interviewed as
part of the study. Her response was:
I will continue to think about it, but it is akin to giving a patient a difficult
diagnosis in healthcare. When you are working with people, whether it is
clinically or within a research setting, there is a rate at which an individual
member of the public will want information, both in terms of rate and scale. I
don’t think it is helpful to give people answers to questions they haven’t asked
you on complex issues such as these, so my own approach would be; ‘I am
here to explain these things to you, and I will give you an outline of this
subject that you are interested in. You may have further questions, and there is
more evidence and information available, but let’s start with the basics, and
you are welcome to return and ask if you want to know more.’ I think it is
about building layers of information and giving people opportunities to go on
asking questions. In the end, a lot of this information is going to have to be
online, isn’t it? One of the things many members of the public do now, as soon
as there is a health issue, is to look it up on the web. We are going to need
something available on data and its use, clearly documented in everyday
language. People can look at the questions and answers and be offered a staged
process, because for many people who we have spoken to, and there is no
reason for me to think they are not typical, they don’t want to know all of the
complexity, and certainly not at once, but they do want to know how they can
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get further information. So I think that is transparency, willingness to say
more, but not all of it at the outset, is what is necessary to inspire confidence.
The concept of proactive public engagement through layered transparency is
perhaps a useful means of approaching public conversations. In looking at the
different perspectives given by our interviewees, whilst we found agreement on the
need for transparency, interviewees recognise that getting that balance between too
much and too little information is much easier said than done.
Several interviewees acknowledged that there are risks involved in being open
with the public around data systems and data flows. A41 argued that if we let the
public too far into the inner workings of the NHS, then uncomfortable questions
inevitably unfold:
[We need to] spark the realisation around something we should have been
doing for the last three years but have studiously ignored, that we actually
have to start to tell people what we do with data in the NHS and allowing the
conversations and dialogue to happen. …the problem is that no politician
wants the inner workings of the NHS exposed, because otherwise it is like you
guys spend a lot of money on moving money around. That is not the story they
have told about the NHS, so there are all sorts of vested interests. We can’t
quite tell the truth because the truth is a little bit unpalatable. (A41)
The difficulty for those involved in managing the sharing and re-use of health
data is that whilst transparency over data systems in the NHS and beyond may
contribute to public trust, there is no simple symbiotic relationship. Too much
transparency is a risk, not just because a little bit of public knowledge can be
dangerous, but also because it has the capacity to lay bare ethical questions and
concerns. How can we use transparency to reach the tipping point where knowledge
of data systems and processes becomes sufficient to enable public trust?
A question of ethics?
Routinely collected administrative data are increasingly shared between UK
government departments and re-used in support of other government policies, such
as immigration enforcement. For example, a Memorandum of Understanding
(MoU) between the Department of Health, NHS Digital and the Home Office makes
it clear that administrative data on individual patients held by NHS Digital can now
be used directly for the purposes of immigration enforcement, to ‘reduce the size of
the illegal population and prevent harm caused by illegal migrants’ (MOU 2017,
p. 14). The public may be concerned when the government’s re-use of the data is so
far removed from the purpose of the original data collection (Mail Online 2017).
Questions of trust are raised in relation to the balance of public goods bound up in
the re-use of the data: whilst the government may deem immigration enforcement to
be in the public interest, the fear of enforcement may deter individuals from
accessing health services, such as vaccination, to the detriment of both the
individual and the collective public. The apparent secrecy in which such data-
sharing agreements have been established causes further distrust.
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Another example is public reaction following revelations over the sharing of
education data for immigration enforcement. Public controversy followed the UK
government’s decision to include country of birth and nationality as new categories
on the school census, which is passed to the Home Office. Campaign groups such as
Liberty have suggested that ‘this isn’t a data-sharing agreement—it is a secret
government programme that turns the Department for Education into a border
control force with an explicit aim to create a hostile environment in schools and
assist with mass deportation of innocent children and their families’ (The Guardian
2016c). Little effort was evident to build public trust through transparency. As a
result, lobby groups, opposition MPs and the press urged parents and schools to
boycott the school census. Here, as with care.data, the distrust felt by the public in
relation to government data sharing led to a threat of withdrawal of cooperation.
This distrust not only adversely affects government but radiates through the abstract
system: research relying on the school census as a data source will be adversely
affected if public cooperation is withdrawn.
In relation to the balance of trust across the system and the relationship between
trust and trustworthiness, a complex picture emerges. In parts of the system, data
sharing appears to be happening between government departments without adequate
checks and balances, as described above; here measures to increase trustworthiness
through greater degrees of scrutiny and transparency appear necessary. In other
parts of the system, legitimate requests to re-use government administrative data for
academic research are heavily scrutinised and controlled. For instance, a university
researcher’s application for access to health data held by NHS Digital is reviewed
by the Independent Advisory Group on the Release of Data (IGARD), a panel of
specialist and lay members. Proposals also go through institutional Research Ethics
Committees, as well as monitoring by funders. In accordance with the Data
Protection Act 1998 (UK Government 1998), the release must be proportionate to
need, processed securely and not kept longer than necessary. The common law duty
of confidentiality residing in medical information also governs health data access.
Patient consent is required to enable re-use beyond the initial doctor-patient
relationship. This part of the system is so complicated that the question is not
whether there is enough scrutiny, but whether there are too many overlapping layers
of governance. Is governance effective and proportionate to the risks, or is it
excessive auditing? Is the prevailing culture of risk adversity inherent in these
processes hampering potentially life-changing and life-saving research?
Carter et al. (2015) identify the need to build ‘social legitimacy’ in data-sharing
initiatives. In keeping with their argument, we suggest that generating public trust in
data sharing requires a strategy that goes beyond simple transparency and moves
towards building collectively agreed boundaries in data-sharing practices. This
depends on generating the political will to foster deep engagement around
government data-sharing practices and a willingness to educate and involve experts
and the broader public in exploring the underlying ethical questions and concerns.
We argue that however challenging and difficult, robust transparency over the
issues, coupled with a collective societal shaping of the parameters of legitimacy, is
fundamental in moving towards reflexive and deliberated public trust.
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Media reporting has shaped public knowledge of the ethics of sharing and re-
using administrative data, which has become fixated on particular risks (such as re-
identifying individuals from large datasets and commercial access and re-use). The
public have been encouraged to worry over issues that are already tightly governed,
whilst remaining ignorant of many deeper issues that have not yet been robustly or
adequately addressed.
Trusting data integrity and reliability?
A great deal of attention has been given to developing a consent model for the
sharing of confidential patient data within and beyond the provision of direct patient
care, most recently by Caldicott in her Review of Data Security, Consent and Opt-
Outs (2016). Caldicott points to the public knowledge gap and the public
engagement work necessary alongside a consent model:
This has been a report about trust. It is hard for people to trust what they do not
understand, and the Review found that people do not generally understand
how their information is used by health and social care organisations…. public
understanding of the use and benefits of information sharing is limited – in
particular there is a knowledge gap about the crucial need to share information
across organisations to integrate health and social care and to fully benefit the
individual with its potential use (pp. 42–43).
The consent model proposed by Caldicott across health and social care exposes a
dichotomy between uses of data for direct care (which are implicitly presented as
unproblematic) and for secondary purposes (which are implicitly presented as risky
by the presence of an opt-out). The reality shown in our study is more complex. A39
described NHS hospitals routinely linking patient-level secondary care data on
hospital admissions to patient-level primary care (GP) data. Patients at risk are
identified and notifications sent to their GP to review their care plans. However, the
effectiveness of the extrapolations relies on the underlying data quality and match
rates in the linkage, yet quality in data and in methods of linking have been
inadequately explored.
An NHS England internal report (Brown 2016) showed that identifiers are used to
link records, both within and across datasets. Incomplete or inaccurate recording of
identifiers leads to data linkage errors, via ‘missed matches’ ‘where records
belonging to the same individual fail to be linked’ and ‘false matches where records
belonging to different individuals are erroneously linked’. Of concern is the fact that
‘these linkage errors are often not randomly distributed, leading to implications for
clinical practice and bias in analyses’ and ‘that data quality is less robust for hard-
to-reach populations… for example people from deprived areas, people from
different ethnic groups, cross border patients and homeless people.’ (Brown 2016,
p. 5).
Data linkage is effectively being used as a form of ‘diagnostic testing’ (A39) yet
its quality and reliability is not assured. The potential in linked data to enhance
patient management is being exploited, before the robustness of the techniques
underpinning it have been adequately evidenced and without the necessary
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governance, checks and balances and safeguards. A39 highlighted this as a broader
ethical issue:
We have regulation sitting over devices, breast implants, drugs, yet we have
no research and development to investigate the provenance, the applicability,
the effectiveness of using data in individual patient management. … In
essence, [doctors] have no control over how information technology is being
used. These decisions are being made by computer contractors, by HSCIC, by
NHS England, outside the remit and the advocacy role of the Doctor-Patient
relationship. … We have a national screening committee, we have clear
approaches for evaluating new screening tests and deciding whether we should
screen babies for cystic fibrosis, for example. We have no similar systems for
evaluating this technology which is changing the way we work…. Can you
imagine devices or drugs being purchased across the NHS when you had no
idea how they were made? And whether they are really what they are
supposed to be? And this is much worse than that, this issue of big data usage
in individual patient management, it is much bigger money, and bigger
consequences.
This gets to the heart of the arguments presented in this paper: the need for
greater transparency over the complex issues around the use of data across and
beyond government. Transparency is a starting point for enabling a common
approach between experts and the public to shape the boundaries of what is socially
acceptable in data use. The shaping of these boundaries should then enable the
development of adequate safeguards, checks and balances from which the
trustworthiness of the processes can be established and held to account. Such
transparency, leading to engagement and collectively shaped boundaries of
legitimacy, as the basis for appropriate checks and balances has the potential to
build informed and deliberated public trust. Yet there are (perhaps insurmountable)
risks in taking such an approach. How can the public become knowledgeable
enough to enable the introduction of these complexities without inducing panic? In
a ‘risk society’, a pervading culture of suspicion is made worse when public
perceptions are shaped by media reports. O’Neill has argued that freedom of the
press should not include the licence to deceive (2002b, pp. 92–99). Media reporting
offers a ‘robust and widely accessible’ forum in which a ‘complex and multi-faceted
debate’ plays out and may even ‘contribute to restoring public trust’ (2002a, p. 168).
Regulation of media communication is therefore part of the broader question of how
to enable the transparency and engagement that could ultimately build public trust
without it leading to deeper levels of distrust.
Conclusions: risking trust to gain it?
We have elucidated here some of the tensions connected to health and education
data that became evident to us through dialogue with interviewees in our case
studies. We sought to map relationships of trust between data providers, data users
and data subjects, exploring the shifting relationships and interdependencies. The
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trust issues raised are only a part of the picture of data-sharing initiatives involving
government administrative data: other articles from this research will discuss
consent and risk. Building public trust in data initiatives is complex as the data is
stretched away from its originating context and held in abstract systems with
multiple intersections of agents and processes. Data sharing and re-use in these
environments is both increasingly difficult to grasp, and increasingly ethically
challenging. There is no easy answer on how to break down this complexity and
enable informed public debate.
We have drawn out differences between trustworthiness and trust and argued that
it is necessary to engage in initiatives that build both. In trustworthy systems and
processes, a balance must be struck between appropriate monitoring in the system
whilst ensuring against excessive auditing that may counterproductively contribute
to the erosion of trust. Intelligent accountability built on citizen cooperation is the
aim. In forging public trust, we argue that transparency is needed to enable expert
and public engagement with the issues in order to collectively shape the boundaries
of legitimacy, which should lead to the checks and balances needed for
trustworthiness.
Is it worth engaging the public in collectively shaping the boundaries of
legitimacy in relation to data sharing? Is it even possible, given the level of
knowledge that is required to understand the data-sharing landscape and reach a
positive tipping point? And even if it is, will a collectively shaped sense of
legitimacy ultimately lead to building and maintaining public trust?
Building public trust through public engagement where the ethical complexities
of data use are opened out is a risky strategy: securing public trust cannot
necessarily be guaranteed. Giddens warns that in a risk society, cultures of suspicion
are hard to break down. Securing a consensus on the underpinning ethics of data
sharing, if done well, with adequate investment and care, may well generate greater
degrees of collective trust. Simple transparency may not be enough, opening up as
many questions as it answers. Can we trust existing linkage and data quality as
reliable diagnostic tools? The ethics of data sharing is often framed by media reports
as risky: if gaining public trust cannot be guaranteed by enabling the public to shape
the boundaries of legitimate data sharing, then should we take that risk? Perhaps,
following O’Neill, the balance of trust needs to shift from securing public trust as
the ultimate aim, to the more fundamental principle of avoiding deception. The
question of how to successfully engage with the public demands further attention,
but the argument on why it is necessary to seek public cooperation in shaping the
boundaries of trust in data sharing, comes down to how much do we, and our
governments, want to commit to the notion that there should be ‘no surprises’ for
the public in relation to administrative data-sharing practices.
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